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Executive summary 
 
1. Research objectives:  
 
This report forms part of the DfID-funded research project Understanding the Political Economy of 
Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development being undertaken by the Institute for Development 
Studies (IDS), which aims to, “inform policy and programming around climate change and 
development by exploring how ideas, power and resources are distributed and contested in 
different  contexts, and the implications for development outcomes.”1 The objectives of this 
case study of the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) in Nepal are three fold: 
i. To understand how different world views of global environmental governance, development 
and climate change are interpreted and play out at the national level in relation to the PPCR; 
ii. To provide empirical analysis of how institutions, politics and power mediate the distribution 
of contested resources in Nepal in the context of the PPCR, and the implications for 
development outcomes;  
iii. To understand the flow of ideas and ideologies of the PPCR in the national context and the 
interactions (and/or resistance) with national policy processes and regional identities.  
 
2. Methodology  
 
The findings presented in this paper are based on case study data on the PPCR process in Nepal 
collected and analysed between July and December 2010.  Methods of data collection included an 
initial stakeholder and institutional analysis conducted at the outset of the study and updated 
throughout the study period; key informant interviews; and document analysis of formal and 
informal PPCR and climate change planning documentation generated throughout the PPCR process 
to date.  
 
3. Findings 
 
The case study data from this study is organized around two key areas of findings:  
 
3.i Key issues of negotiation  
 
Three key issues of negotiation have been identified:  
 
The relationship between the NAPA and the PPCR  
 
The PPCR planning process in Nepal began at a similar time to the development of the National 
Adaption Programme of Action (NAPA). The PPCR process is mandated to “build on” NAPAs however 
different interpretations of what this means led to confusion over the relationship between the two. 
Government stakeholders and some donors had expectations that the PPCR could be used to fund 
some NAPA outputs, whilst the MDBs argued that funding NAPAs was not consistent with the remit 
of the PPCR.  This led to disappointment on behalf of the government over the PPCR process, and 
accusations of a lack of responsiveness to national priorities by the MDBs.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 IDS, 2010. Understanding the Political Economy of Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development: Terms of 
Reference for Case Studies. 
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This tension was recognised by the MDBs and somewhat managed by the way in which the PPCR 
development has explicitly built on NAPA in its development, through the engagement of the NAPA 
stakehodlers, the repeated referencing of the NAPA throughout the PPCR inception documents, and 
the use of NAPA-generated information as 'background' to the PPCT processes. However, members 
of civil society and also from within the NAPA team suggest given there is no precedent for PPCR yet, 
it should be more open to the possibility.  
 
Institutional and financial governance of the PPCR for managing climate change 
 
There are currently three large-scale programmes of work in Nepal that aim to support an 
institutional and financial structure for climate change governance in Nepal: The NAPA; the DfID/EU 
Nepal Climate Change Support Programme (NCCSP) that aims to support a national institutional 
framework and financing mechanism to manage climate finance and to channel resources to local, 
district and sub-regional levels; and the PPCR. The need to coordinate the three processes to avoid a 
proliferation of potential climate change institutional structures is important.  
 
There was general consensus from stakeholders that the three programmes of work were largely 
complementary:  
 PPCR should “build on” NAPA but be longer term and more strategic;  
 DfID/EU focuses on local scale delivery mechanisms of NAPA and other climate change 
programmes 
 PPCR aims to support higher level climate change mainstreaming at the sectoral and 
national levels. 
 
A key issue for negotiation was the role of the Ministry of Environment in any coordinated 
mechanism for institutional and financial management of these and other processes. Negotiation 
around a proposed common institutional structure has focused around current relative lack of 
fiduciary standards and experience versus the need for capacity building and for the MOE to 
demonstrate its capacity to absorb large-scale climate finance for future investments.  
 
Loans versus grants 
 
The PPCR funds are comprised of a mix of loans and grants. This has been controversial because of 
the principle that vulnerable countries should not have to take loans for adaptation, because 
adaptation finance should be 'additional' to development funding given that climate change is an 
additional burden to existing development stresses. Countries applying to the PPCR for funds are 
able to apply for both the loan and grant component; or the grant component only, depending on 
their needs.  
 
The Government of Nepal initially only wanted the grant component of the PPCR, however following 
the precedents set by other PPCR countries that were taking the loan component also, a decision 
was taken to also accept the loan. This decision was heavily criticized by civil society. The issue 
remains undecided following change of Government and new Minister for Environment.   
 
3.ii. Conceptualisation 
 
The negotiation of the key issues above was closely tied in with the different and sometimes 
conflicting ways in which key concepts were conceptualised by different stakeholders,  namely 
climate resilience (and the associated concepts of adaptation and adaptive capacity); national 
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ownership and 'country drivenness'; and transformative change.   These different conceptualisations 
by different stakeholders are briefly summarised in table 1, below.  
 
Table 1: Summary of different conceptualisations by different stakeholder groups2 
 Climate resilience Adaptation National 
Ownership 
Transformational 
change 
Government  Synonymous 
with 
adaptation  
 Long term and 
strategic 
 Programmatic 
and integrated 
 Addresses 
underlying 
vulnerability to 
climate 
variability and 
climate change 
 Long term 
and 
strategic 
 Programmat
ic and 
integrated 
 Addresses 
underlying 
vulnerability 
to climate 
variability 
and climate 
change  
 The NAPA 
presents 
Government 
climate change 
priorities 
 Government 
should be able 
to drive design 
process inc. 
fund allocation 
 Consultants 
should be 
accountable to 
Government 
 Beyond 
consultants and 
TA - full capacity 
within 
Government to 
manage CC 
 Adaptive capacity 
enhanced at the 
local level  
 Adaptive capacity 
no longer 
constrained by 
poverty  
MDB/Consul
tants 
 Long term and 
Strategic 
 Mainstreamed 
 "Climate 
proofing" 
 Climate risk 
management 
 Response to 
future climate 
change 
 An additional 
need in light of 
new climate 
risks 
 Urgent and 
immediate 
 Short term 
 Projectised 
 Response to 
current 
climatic 
variability  
 Does not 
adequately 
address 
longer term 
climate 
resilience  
 Consultants 
based inside 
Government 
and liaise 
frequently with 
Government 
 Government 
engaged with  
procurement 
 Consultants 
work with 
Government 
on drafting 
process 
 Moving beyond 
"business as 
usual"  
 Systems, 
processes and 
procedures are 
climate proofed 
 Over and above 
development - 
influence the way 
development 
decisions are 
made in light of 
climate change 
risks 
Donor   The same as 
adaptation, ie: 
 Long term and 
strategic 
 Programmatic 
and integrated 
 Addresses 
underlying 
vulnerability to 
climate 
variability and 
 Long term 
and 
strategic 
 Programmat
ic and 
integrated 
 Addresses 
underlying 
vulnerability 
to climate 
variability 
 The 
Government 
should be able 
to define 
climate change 
risks 
 NAPA 
represents 
Government 
driven process 
so this should 
 Transformation 
of national 
systems for 
longer term 
"adaptive 
management"  
 Focus on 
governance  
 Moving away 
from a 
dependence on 
                                                          
2
 Based on analysis of KI interviews. This table summarises some key statements made by individuals and also 
those made in related project documentation. 
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climate change and climate 
change 
be built on 
 Recognises 
high fiduciary 
risks  
donor TA towards 
Governments 
being able to do 
this themselves 
 
These different conceptualisations are all related and mutually reinforcing, and they have had a 
significant impact on what issues were negotiated and how.  But these conceptualisations in turn are 
based on the 'bigger picture' remits and experiences of each stakeholder groups that create 
incentives for different approaches. 
 
4. Recommendations 
 
This makes the following recommendations for stakeholders engaged in the PPCR in Nepal as the 
process moves forward:  
 
i) Approaches to supporting national ownership  
 The “Mission-style” approach to PPCR planning was not conducive to fostering relationships 
between the different sets of stakeholders engaged in the PPCR or generating government 
ownership over the planning process. Once this was supported by the SPCR consulting team 
based in the Ministry, all stakeholders suggested that relations and understanding were 
improved and reinstating a similar mechanism for continuous working with MOE is 
recommended. 
 However, the reporting of this team primarily to the MDBs rather than to MOE, and the 
limited influence of MOE over the workings of the team limited government ownership and 
‘buy-in’ to the teams outputs. Further, once the team was disbanded the capacity built 
during their time there was also lost. It is recommended that a greater degree of control 
over any consulting team is given to MOE to ensure increased engagement and learning 
during the PPCR preparation process.  
 Short time-lines were given to MOE to comment on Mission outputs, however flexibility was 
given where deadlines could not be met. This flexibility should be maintained but working 
more closely with the government drafting and documentation perhaps through the 
mechanisms above should help all stakeholders to set and meet more realistic deadlines for 
feedback.  
 
ii) Wider incentives for transformational change 
 
Transformational change is interpreted as more than “climate proofing” development, but in 
building the capacity of the government of Nepal to achieve long term climate resilient 
development. In line with recommendation (i) this means moving away from a dependence on 
donor technical assistance towards Governments long term enhanced capacity.  
 
This requires mechanisms in place that reward greater government capacity and control, rather than 
those that reward fast and more tangible results. This may include:  
 Building in and emphasising government capacity indicators into monitoring and evaluation 
systems.  
 Reconsidering PPCR engagement in a multi-donor trust fund. This could increase the 
capacity and autonomy of the Government to manage adaptation investments, in line with  
“transformational change” objectives, in line with the PPCR mandate. This would increase 
national ownership and provide an opportunity for the Government of Nepal to 
demonstrate “absorptive capacity” for future large scale climate change finance.  
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 PPCR implementing agencies need to be allocated time and resources to support the process 
of “transformational change.” With limited time and resources it is difficult to implementing 
agencies to shift away from a ‘business as usual’ model, even if the ‘business’ is ‘climate 
proofed.’ 
 
Responsive approach 
 
There are currently no precedents for PPCR planning for achieving transformational change. This 
creates opportunities for donors and implementing agencies to be responsive to national demands. 
Examples from Nepal include:  
 Taking forward or incorporating some NAPA priorities. 
 Supporting government decisions over loan and grant components, acknowledging the 
pressure the government is under from civil society on this issue.   
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Research aims 
 
This report forms part of the DfID-funded research project Understanding the Political Economy of 
Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development being undertaken by the Institute for Development 
Studies (IDS), which aims to, 
 
  inform policy and programming around climate change and development by 
 exploring how ideas, power and resources are distributed and contested in different 
 contexts, and the implications for development outcomes.3  
 
As part of this project, IIED has been commissioned to undertake a detailed case study analysis of 
the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) in Nepal. The PPCR is a programme developed 
under the World Bank managed Strategic Climate Fund, one of the two Climate Investment Funds 
(CIFs) (see www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/ppcr for more information).  The CIFs were 
established outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process 
to "bridge the financing and learning gap" to respond to the urgent need for action on climate 
change. Approved in 2008, the CIFs are larger than all of the existing funds under the UNFCCC 
process.4  
 
The CIFs both reflect and are also likely to catalyse significant changes in the global political 
dynamics and incentive structures of climate change response measures. This changing international 
landscape of financial flows for climate change will inevitably influence the context of national-level 
of decision-making around climate change policy and investment. Yet to date there is relatively little 
research into how these changes to global level political and financial dynamics might play out at the 
national level.5  
 
This study addresses this research gap through a detailed analysis of the political economy of the 
PPCR process in Nepal.  In line with the Terms of Reference for this study, the objectives of this case 
analysis are three fold: 
iv. To understand how different world views of global environmental governance, development 
and climate change are interpreted and play out at the national level in relation to the PPCR; 
v. To provide empirical analysis of how institutions, politics and power mediate the distribution 
of contested resources in Nepal in the context of the PPCR, and the implications for 
development outcomes;  
vi. To understand the flow of ideas and ideologies of the PPCR in the national context and the 
interactions (and/or resistance) with national policy processes and regional identities.  
 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
To meet these objectives, IIED collected and analysed data relevant to the political economy of the 
PPCR process in Nepal between July and December 2010.  Methods of data collection included: 
                                                          
3
 IDS, 2010. Understanding the Political Economy of Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development: Terms of 
Reference for Case Studies. 
4
 Seballos, 2010. PPCR institutional structures. Unpublished background note provided by author.  
5
 IDS, 2010. Understanding the Political economy of Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development: Scoping 
Report and Workplan, April 2010. IDS.  
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 Initial stakeholder and institutional mapping and analysis conducted at the outset of the 
study and updated throughout the study period in response to research findings as they 
emerged (see section 3); 
  key informant interviews (semi-structured and open ended) with key stakeholders 
identified through the stakeholder mapping exercise (four groups of stakeholders were 
identified: Government, focusing on Ministry of Environment but discussions were also held 
with Ministry of Finance and National Planning Commission and the line ministry members 
of NAPA Thematic Working Groups; MDBs and implementing agencies; and donors, focusing 
on DfID as one of the main donors to the PPCR process but discussions were also held with 
Danida, USAID and SNV).  
  Document analysis of formal and informal PPCR-related documentation generated 
throughout the PPCR process from its inception in May 2009 through to the outputs of the 
most recent mission in November 2010; 
  The production of a 'living' historical timeline the PPCR process from its inception to date, 
that continues to be updated (presented in section 3 of this report).  
 
This data was analysed against three sets of interrelated research questions around ideologies, 
institutions and power, and capacity and resources, as proposed in the overall scoping and workplan 
provided by IDS:6  
 
Ideas and ideology  
a) How are climate change and development interventions conceptualised by different groups 
of actors nationally and internationally? 
b) How are these different conceptualisations interpreted and contested at national level? 
 
Institutions and power  
a) What are the formal and informal mechanisms for decision making around climate change 
initiatives at national and international scale? 
b) How do different groups and individuals exert power over others to enable or resist 
processes of change around low carbon and climate resilient development? 
 
Capacity and resource distribution 
a) What are the barriers or constraints to technical capacity? 
b) What is the intended or actual distribution of resources? 
 
As far as possible all data used to draw conclusions for this study has been triangulated through 
these different information sources to ensure accuracy and objectiveness in data analysis.  A draft 
report was shared with all key informant interviewees to cross-check data interpretation.  
 
 
1.3 Report outline 
 
The following sections of this report present this analysis. The next section (section two) of this 
report presents an overview of the national climate change policy context in Nepal within which the 
PPCR is set. Section three details the national engagement of Nepal in the PPCR process, from 
country selection through to the outcomes of the PPCR mission in November 2010. This includes an 
analysis of the stakeholders and interests in the PPCR process in Nepal, and a historical timeline of 
                                                          
6
 IDS, 2010. Understanding the Political economy of Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development: Scoping 
Report and Workplan, April 2010. IDS. 
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the process to date. Sections four and five of this report present the outcomes of the political 
economy analysis of the stakeholders and events of the PPCR in Nepal. Section four draws out the 
key points and issues of negotiation and contestation during the PPCR process in Nepal during the 
process. Section five discusses the role of alternative and at times conflicting conceptualisations of 
some key issues in influencing negotiations. The final section of this report discusses some lessons 
and key areas for attention for the next phase of the PPCR process in Nepal and also for climate 
change policy processes elsewhere; as well as some areas of good practice from the PPCR process in 
Nepal that should be highlighted and strengthened.  
 
 
 
2. The national climate change policy context in Nepal   
 
Nepal's political priorities are dominated by the post-conflict on-going peace process and 
democratisation process. Nevertheless, within this overall climate of political uncertainty, climate 
change has received high level political support in Nepal, which in turn has led to the development  
of national level policies and institutions for climate change. 
 
2.1 National policy landscape for climate change in Nepal 
 
Climate change in national policy and planning 
 
The integration of climate change into policy frameworks is an ongoing process in Nepal. The GoN 
has commissioned the preparation of a National Climate Change Policy which was finalised in 
January 2011. The policy itself has been under preparation since 2009, and has undergone several 
rounds of consultation with civil society and Government stakeholders. However, as the policy has 
only recently been approved it is difficult to assess its influence at this stage. 
 
The most recent national effort to articulate Nepal's climate change priorities has been through the 
development of Nepal's National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), initiated in May 2009 
and formally launched on November 4th, 2010. The NAPA was undertaken through six government-
led thematic working groups (TWGs): 
 
i. Agriculture and food security (Coordinator: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives) 
ii. Forests and biodiversity (Coordinator: Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation) 
iii. Water and energy (Coordinator: Ministry of Energy) 
iv. Health (Coordinator: Ministry of Health and Population) 
v. Urban settlements (Coordinator: Department of Urban Development and Building 
Construction) 
vi. Disaster risk reduction (Coordinator: Ministry of Home Affairs) 
 
The final NAPA document consolidates the TWG reports and presents the national climate change 
vulnerability and adaptation priorities for Nepal. The final set of adaptation priorities are 'clustered' 
activities that have combined priority adaptation profiles from different TWGs. The NAPA priority 
activities are presented in annex 1.  
 
The NAPA has been endorsed by Cabinet and the Prime Minsters office, and has been presented by 
the Government as the key national document to "provide a basis for the government to guide 
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further climate change governance and manage [climate change] financial resources in a coherent 
and coordinated manner."7 
 
A series of National Five-Year Plans and Three-Year Interim Plans have been formulated aimed at 
achieving poverty reduction by providing a policy framework that encourages investments in 
primary sectors that form the backbone of rural development and poverty reduction. As part of this 
planning framework, the Government of Nepal recently issued the Three Year Plan Approach Paper 
(2010-2012) which includes the objectives of promoting green development, making development 
activities climate-friendly, mitigating the adverse impacts of climate change, and promoting 
adaptation.8  
 
The new constitution is being drafted at a time when climate change is high on the national GoN 
agenda. As such the draft constitution directly references climate change, clearly stating that 
citizens have a ‘right’ to adaptation and should be compensated for the losses and damages caused 
by climate related disasters.  
 
Climate change in sector-wide policies and plans 
 
The most climate sensitive sectors in Nepal are represented by the NAPA thematic working groups 
listed above, and each TWG is led by the relevant line ministry. As part of the NAPA process, each 
NAPA TWG produced a thematic working group report that outlined the national climate change 
vulnerabilities and adaptation priorities relevant to that sector/theme.  
 
Climate change vulnerability has been explicitly or implicitly addressed in some sector level plans. 
For example, the Ministry of Health has prepared a Health Sector Strategy, which will be 
implemented as a sector wide approach (SWAP) by linking the annual work plan under the strategy 
to the MTEF. The latest strategy includes a chapter on climate change & health.  The National 
Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (2009) calls for a shift away from a reactive (relief and 
response) approach to a proactive (preparedness) approach to disaster risk reduction (DRR). It aims 
to mainstream DRR into sector planning and incorporates the principles of the Hyogo Framework. 
The proposed Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plan for Nepal 2010-2013 calls for the preparation of a 
risk-sensitive land use plan for Kathmandu Valley (i.e. the five municipalities and villages within the 
Valley) that provide a framework for development, land allocations and related strategies, policies 
and regulatory tools and procedures for controlling future growth and safeguarding it from natural 
hazards.  
 
Other donor investments in climate change adaptation in Nepal 
 
The Government of Nepal is currently managing a number of donor initiatives in Nepal that have 
synergies with the PPCR. Two significant forthcoming investments are listed below.9 
 
 DfID and Danida have put significant cofinancing into the NAPA (see above).  
 
                                                          
7
 MOE, 2010. Government of Nepal National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change. Ministry of 
environment, Government of Nepal.  
8
 World Bank/ADB/IFC: Aide Memoire to the Joint Mission 15-21st November 2010: Annex 3.  
9
 A comprehensive list of donor investments in climate change in Nepal is being collated under the Climate 
change and Development Portal under the NAPA programme of work, available at www.climatenepal.org.np. 
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In addition, DfID and EU are currently preparing to invest approximately £16m, of which £10m will 
be met by DFID and £6m (Euros 8.5m) by the EU, in a Nepal Climate Change Support Programme 
(NCCSP). The programme will start in early 2011 to support the Government of Nepal in managing 
climate finance and mainstreaming climate change into local and up to national level development 
planning. The programme outputs include:10 
i. Poor and excluded households in the most climate vulnerable regions benefiting 
from locally planned climate adaptation & low emissions initiatives; 
ii. National institutional arrangements and funding mechanisms to channel resources 
to local, district and sub-regional climate adaptation & low emissions initiatives 
coordinated by the GoN climate change focal point - MoE; 
iii. Government and non-government agencies at local to national levels capable to 
support the design, implementation and monitoring & evaluation of climate 
adaptation & low emissions initiatives; 
iv. Climate compatible development strategies, policies, plans, guidelines and multi-
stakeholder organizational and legal frameworks in place at all levels. 
 
The "LAPA" area of support emerged from the NAPA programme of work and is designed to be 
consistent with enabling NAPA implementation at the local level.  
 
USAID have recently announced a "Hariyo Ban" programme, to provide support to reducing  the 
threats of to biodiversity and vulnerabilities of climate change in Nepal through appropriate site-
based interventions  in priority bio-diverse landscapes as well as enabling policy at the national level. 
The programme has three components:  
 Biodiversity conservation 
 Sustainable landscapes and REDD 
 Climate change adaptation 
 
The estimated total programme funding will be USD 30,000,000 and the programme will begin in 
early 2011.11 
 
 
2.2 Institutional frameworks for climate change planning in Nepal  
 
The Ministry of Environment (MOE) is the focal point for most climate change activities including 
those under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Under the MOE there is a Climate Change 
Management Division. MOE plays a key role in overall coordination across scales (between 
adaptation policy and planning and on-the-ground implementation) and across actors (coordinating 
between different donor support avenues, different climate change projects, and activities across 
Ministries under programmes of work managed by MOE).  
 
On 23 July, 2009 the Prime Minister established the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, 
which has met four times since it was established. The Council is a high-level coordinating body with 
responsibility to:  
 Provide coordination, guidance and direction for the formulation and implementation of 
climate-related policies; 
                                                          
10
 NCCSP draft project document, November 2010.  
11
 www.grants.gov/hariyoban 
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 Provide guidance for the integration of climate-related aspects in the long-term policies, 
perspective plans and programmes; 
 Take necessary measures to make climate change a national development agenda; 
 Initiate and coordinate activities related to additional financial and technical support to 
climate change-related programmes and projects; 
 To initiate and coordinate for additional benefit from climate change-related international 
negotiations and decisions.  
 
The Ministry of Environment functions as a secretariat to the Council.  
 
Twenty MPs representing different parties have formed an 'informal MP's group' on climate 
change. Some members of this group have invested their Parliamentarian Development Fund into 
climate related projects. The group members are lobbying for institutionalising a parliamentary 
committee on climate change that could provide a broad framework for the government’s actions 
on climate change.12  
 
The NAPA process in Nepal received additional co-financing from DfID and Danida that was used to 
support an "expanded NAPA" process that included two additional components: 
 
Component 2:  A Climate Change Knowledge Management and Learning Platform for Nepal;  
Component 3: and a Multi-stakeholder Framework for Action on Climate Change in Nepal. 
 
This broader support and knowledge infrastructure was intended to ensure a more strategic 
approach to NAPA preparation and the longer term sustainability of the institutional and knowledge 
capacity built for climate change planning under the NAPA.13 Under the second component of the 
NAPA, in 2010 the GoN established a Knowledge Management (KM) Hub at the national level 
managed by National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST). This is likely to be supported by 
regional knowledge management hub.  
 
Associated with component 3 of the NAPA the GoN has established the Multi-stakeholder Climate 
Change Initiatives Coordination Committee (MCCICC). The MCCICC comprises of 21 plus members. 
As a coordination body at the functional level, the Committee will report to the Climate Change 
Council and contribute to mainstreaming the climate change programmes into the development 
planning and implementation. The functions of the Committee are as follows:  
 Establish, maintain, and improve communication amongst institutions concerned with and 
working in the field of climate change;  
 Coordinate climate change response in Nepal at programmatic level to foster synergy and 
avoid duplication of efforts. The areas that have to be contributed include, but are not 
limited to, policies, plans, strategies, financing, programmes and projects;  
 Provide inputs for developing a national consensus in international climate change 
negotiations;  
 Ensure strategic adaptation and other climate change-related activities financing by 
providing an avenue where needs are identified, articulated, and taken into account in the 
formulation of adaptation financing strategies by development partners and by the 
Government of Nepal;  
                                                          
12
 Paudel, N.S. 2010. Responding to climate change in a transitional Politics: Review of political context in 
relation to designing LAPA in Nepal. Report prepared for CADP-Nepal. November 2010. 
13
 www.napanepal.gov.np/about_napa 
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 Strengthen multi-stakeholder collaboration in responding to climate change including 
management of climate risks and opportunities, long-term adaptation to climate change, 
and building a low carbon and climate-resilient economy, and other areas;  
 Facilitate to clarify any misunderstanding and/or confusion, if occurred, in any stages of the 
project cycle; and  
 Provide inputs and monitor and evaluate the implementation of priority adaptation actions 
as identified in the NAPA and other climate change initiatives.  
 
The Committee is Chaired by the Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, and has representation 
from the six coordinators of the NAPA Thematic Working Groups as well as from the National 
Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, NGOs and academia, local government associations, 
and donor agencies.  
 
The six NAPA Thematic Working Groups (TWGs) have been institutionalised under the MCCICC and 
are comprised of experts representing relevant sub-sectors and are coordinated by the Joint 
Secretaries of the concerned Ministry.  As institutional structures, they have the potential of playing 
a key role for future cross-sectoral integration and coordination of climate change adaptation 
initiatives. 
 
An implementation framework for climate change adaptation in Nepal  
 
One innovative feature of the Nepal NAPA document is the presentation of an implementation 
framework for climate change adaptation projects in Nepal, that is intended to depict how all the 
above institutional structures could be operationalised in a coordinated. This structure is presented 
in figure 1.  
 
Under the NAPA implementation framework, technical responsibilities are delegated to the 
appropriate ministries and the appropriate governance level, but the implementation of all 
adaptation projects (including those outside the NAPA) should be subsumed under this common 
coordination, management and monitoring mechanism. At the central level, the MOE is responsible 
for coordination and for reporting to and liaising with the Climate Change Council (which forms the 
apex body responsible for policy coordination). Within MOE, a Climate Change Program and 
Monitoring Unit provides operational coordination to different programmes. It also supports village 
development committees and municipalities in incorporating adaptation into local planning.  
 
At the project level, the major responsibility for implementing a project falls within the ambit of the 
appropriate line ministry (the "implementing ministry"). If a project is multi-disciplinary and 
integrated in nature MOE will designate the appropriate implementing ministry through consultation 
with all relevant ministries. The implementing ministry is then responsible for constituting a Project 
Coordination Committee to guide project implementing, comprised of representatives from all 
relevant line ministries, development partners, experts and beneficiary groups.  
 
At the local level, a District Coordination Committee will be formed through the District 
Development Committee  (although this mechanism is flexible in response to specific circumstances 
and capacities of the local governance systems in place). This committee will be represented by a 
diverse set of local actors from beneficiaries relevant to service delivery agents responsible for 
ultimate project implementation and monitoring and evaluation.  
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It is the Government of Nepal's intention that the implementation structure proposed under the 
NAPA forms the basis for implementation of all adaptation interventions and investments in Nepal.14 
The objectives of the PPCR state that,15  
 
The pilot programs implemented under the PPCR should be country led, build on National Adaptation 
Programs of Action (NAPA) and other relevant country studies and strategies, and be strategically 
aligned with the Adaptation Fund and other  donor funded activities. 
 
The following sections of this report will therefore include a review of the extent to which the PPCR 
has succeeded in engaging with, building on and coordinating with the above policy and institutional 
structures, and the NAPA in particular. 
 
3. National engagement with the PPCR process 
 
This section will first briefly review some of the key goals and objectives of the PPCR and provide 
some background information that is relevant to the analysis presented in later sections of this 
report. This section will then review the national PPCR process in Nepal from country selection 
through to the most recent joint mission undertaken in November 2010.  
 
3.1 Background to the PPCR in Nepal 
 
                                                          
14
 MOE, 2010. Government of Nepal National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change. Ministry of 
environment, Government of Nepal; supported by interviews with MOE, MOF and NPC.  
15
 PPCR/SC.1/CRP.1 
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As noted in the introduction, the PPCR is one of the Climate Investment Funds established under the 
Strategic Climate Fund. The overall objective of the PPCR as described in the PPCR design 
document16 is to  "Pilot and demonstrate ways to integrate climate risk and resilience into core 
development planning, whilst complementing other ongoing activities". The aim of the PPCR is to 
achieve this objective by, 
 
 "providing incentives for scaled-up action and transformational change in integrating consideration 
of climate resilience in national development planning consistent with poverty reduction and 
sustainable development goals".
17
 
 
In support of these aims and objectives, the PPCR will support two kinds of activities:  
i. Funding for technical assistance to enable developing countries to build on existing national 
work to integrate climate resilience into national or sectoral development plans, strategies 
and financing; 
ii. Provide additional financial resources to help fund a program of public and private sector 
investments identified in national or sectoral development plans or strategies addressing 
climate resilience 
 
The majority of funding under the PPCR is provided through grant allocations, however some of the 
funding is available through highly concessional loans. Countries have the autonomy to decide 
whether they want to take both grant and loan allocations, or only grants; although the PPCR 
guidelines suggest that funding for additional costs directly associated with technical assistance and 
institutional adjustment should be provided through grants only.18  
 
Nepal is one of nine countries to be invited by the World Bank to participate in the PPCR.19 Countries 
were selected to participate in the PPCR on the basis of exposure to climatic hazards; vulnerability to 
climatic hazards; and 'country-preparedness' to demonstrate results.20 Nepal was selected as one 
South Asian priority country (in addition to Bangladesh) on the basis of it being a mountain 
ecosystem highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change including glacial melt; and a low 
adaptive capacity (based on a low Human Development Index).21 During selection, the capacity of 
Nepal to 'demonstrate results' was questioned because one of the primary indicators used to 
demonstrate results was the existence of a NAPA or similar adaptation planning framework at the 
country level.22 At the time of selection, Nepal had signed its NAPA project document in November 
2008 but there was a significant lag between the signing of this document and the NAPA Inception in 
May 2009.  
                                                          
16
 PPCR/SC.1/CRP.1 
17
 Ibid; italics own 
18
 Ibid 
19
 The others are Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Niger, Tajikistan, Yemen and Zambia, in 
addition to two 'regional programmes' being undertaken in the Caribbean and the Pacific.  
20
 Climate Investment Funds 2009. The Selection of Countries to Participate in the PPC: Report of the Expert 
Group to the Subcommittee of the PPCR.  
21
 Ibid 
22
 Author's notes, meeting of the Expert Group to the Subcommittee of the PPCR, World Bank, Washington DC, 
January 20th.  
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Following completion of the country selection process, the PPCR planning takes place in two phases. 
Phase one involves facilitation of a cross-sectoral dialogue process to arrive at a common vision of 
climate resilience in the medium and long term, and the formulation of a strategic approach for 
climate resilience. This involves the development of a strategic Programme for Climate Resilience 
(SPCR) that is submitted for endorsement by the PPCR Sub-committee (see box 1).  Phase two 
involves the implementation of the strategic programme through the relevant multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) alongside their lending and technical assistance portfolios. In Nepal, the 
MDBs are the World Bank through 
partnership with the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB).  
 
The following sections will describe the 
progress of the PCCR and SPCR in Nepal 
since Nepal's selection as a pilot country. 
 
 
3.2 The PPCR programme in Nepal: The 
story so far 
 
A timeline of key events in the PPCR 
process to February 2011 is presented in 
figure 2, below.  
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience 
(SPCR) 
Source: MOE/PPCR Team, 2010: Developing Nepal's 
SPCR: Prioritisation Planning Process (draft).  
 
The SPCR should outline governments agreed long-
term vision to agree a climate resilient trajectory 
and a critical path to get there. This should include 
the consideration of vulnerable economic sectors, 
specific social groups (including women, youth, 
indigenous peoples, and local communities) and 
ecosystems. The SPCR will include proposed 
activities or programme components for PPCR 
financing, including technical assistance and other 
investments. Detailed preparation of each activity 
will be pursued in accordance with the procedures 
of the MDB(s) partnering the country.  
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The first 'key date' for the PPCR in Nepal is May 2009, which marked the initiation of not only PPCR 
activities but also, significantly, those of the NAPA. Nepal's engagement began with the acceptance 
of the offer for participation by the Ministry of Environment (the national focal point for the PPCR) 
on behalf of the Government of Nepal on 13th May 2009.23 This was shortly before the Inception 
Workshop for the NAPA, which took place over two days between the 25th-26th of May 2009. 
Acknowledging the need for close coordination with the NAPA process from both the Government of 
Nepal and also the MDBs, the Government of Nepal invited ADB to present at the NAPA inception 
workshop on the PPCR and the potential for synergies with NAPA and other national climate change 
activities. 
 
During the workshop presentations by ADB, DfID (one of the key donors to the PPCR as well as the 
'expanded NAPA') and also the Government of Nepal discussed opportunities for synergies between 
NAPA and PPCR. 24 Presentations and discussions on coordination between the two processes show 
a divergence of opinions on what the synergies could be. The ADB presentation focused on 
opportunities for "harmonised planning" and for the PPCR to "build on" the NAPA process. However 
the report of the discussion following the presentation from ADB on the PPCR process shows that 
some workshop participants suggested that complementarities between NAPA outputs and PPCR 
objectives might enable “the PPCR to fund some NAPA projects but confirmation of this would 
depend on NAPA and PPCR processes as they develop."25 Similar suggestions were also made during 
presentations by DfID.26 The workshop therefore marks the beginning of conflicting interpretations 
around the relationship between the NAPA and the PPCR.  
 
Between May and September a consultant for ADB undertook a stocktaking exercise to analyse 
institutional options for coordinating the design and implementation of the PPCR in Nepal, ahead of 
the first PPCR Joint Mission schedules for September 2009.27 On the 10th of July 2009, the Ministry 
of Environment (MOE) convened an inter-ministerial dialogue to reach agreement on an interim 
institutional arrangement for managing the PPCR, during which Government stakeholders confirmed 
that the PPCR decision-making body would be the Climate Change Council (see section 2), with MOE 
serving as coordinating/facilitating agency and other agencies serving as implementing agencies for 
adaptation programmes and projects.  
 
The first Joint Mission was fielded by the World Bank, the ADB and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) from September 3-9, 2009. The timing of this Mission is significant because it was 
intentionally planned to take place immediately after a Regional Climate Change Conference that 
took place on 31st August-1st September, 2009. During this conference, the Government of Nepal 
invited 14 donors and multilaterals28 to sign a Donor Compact on Climate Change in Nepal29, in 
which all signatories including the Government of Nepal committed to a set of principles to guide 
development partners in supporting action on climate change in Nepal. These principles included 
acknowledging the role of line Ministries in leading the integration of climate resilience in their 
                                                          
23
 MOEST, 2009. Country Acceptance of Offer to Participate in the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience.   
24
 MOEST, 2009. NAPA Project inception Report, 25-26 may, 2009. www.napanepal.gov.np.  
25
 MOEST, 2009. NAPA Project inception Report, 25-26 may, 2009 pp. 10.  
26
 Ibid:14.  
27
 Si, 2009. Climate Change Stocktaking Report for Nepal. Backgrounder for joint Programming Mission for teh 
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience. Draft for Workshop Participants. Unpublished copy obtained from 
Author, not approved for citation.  
28
 CIDA, SDC, Finland, AUSAID, SNV, EC, ADB, WB, DfID, GTZ, UNDP, Danida, Norway, and USAID.  
29
 www.moenv.gov.np/np/downlaods/donor%20compact.pdf 
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respective sectors; the lead role of the MOE but acknowledging the support of the Ministry of 
Finance, the National Planning Commission, and in close consultation with other Ministries; and 
significantly, the harmonised and aligned actions on climate change by all development partners.  
 
Organising the first Joint Mission for the PPCR had practical value. All key climate change 
stakeholders were together and available for consultation in Nepal, including key Government 
stakeholders, civil society representatives and donor and multilateral agencies. However there was 
also symbolic value, as the Mission presented the first opportunity for donors, multilaterals and the 
Government of Nepal to demonstrate their commitment to coordination and cooperation in light of 
the Donor Compact.30   
 
The Joint Mission started with a two-day residential meeting outside Kathmandu at Gorkana Forest 
Resort. As well as the MOE, ADB and WB stakeholders, the NAPA team and NAPA TWGs were also 
invited to participate. High-level international World Bank and IFC staff also attended. The objectives 
of the mission were to "take stock of the range of climate change related activities in Nepal and 
agree with the Government of Nepal on the process and the broad scope of potential PPCR 
activities."31 The residential meeting began with a presentation to all stakeholders by senior World 
Bank and ADB officials on the objectives of the PPCR; and a presentation of the stocktaking report. 
The rest of the meeting focused on sector-based working-group work on identifying climate change 
impacts; existing response systems; gaps between 'current levels and desired level of climate 
proofing' in sectors; policy and capacity needs for mainstreaming climate change into 
national/sectoral development policies and planning; and the identification of needs that PPCR could 
address.32  
 
Interviews with participants of the first Joint Mission suggest some tensions emerged during this 
residential phase, around two related issues. The first was around the nature of the process; some 
participants felt that they were being asked to identify climate change priorities for their sectors in 
too short a time period and without adequate consultation with wider stakeholder groups. For 
example, one government participant from a NAPA TWG noted that in his breakout group he worked 
with others to come up with some priorities but 'another set of people would have decided 
something different. We were a very small group all with our own agendas'. Another government 
TWG participant said he felt uncomfortable being asked to identify key issues for his sector in the 
absence of senior government staff from his sector there, given the strong hierarchy with in 
Government that meant participants felt they risked the outcomes of the meeting not being 
approved by more senior Government levels in their sectors with potentially damaging 
consequences for the TWG members who were engaged.  
 
However, these concerns were in part due to a lack of clarification on the objectives of these 
sessions. It was stated by the MDBs that this Mission was 'to get a feel for technical assistance needs 
and potential future directions, not to write the PPCR in two days.'33  
 
A second tension arose through the emergence of confusions around the relationship between the 
PPCR and NAPA processes. Some workshop participants felt that the NAPA was already identifying 
                                                          
30
 Interview notes, DfID, ADB and GoN.  
31
 ADB/IFC/World Bank - Government of Nepal, 2009. Draft Aide Memoire: Multilateral Development Bank 
(MDB) Programming Mission for the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, September 3-9, 2009.  
32
 PCPR Mission Nepal First Joint Programming Mission (ADB, World Bank, IFC) 3-9 September 2009 Mission 
Program/Schedule.  
33
 MDB representative 
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national climate change priorities and adaptation options through a consultative process. 
Expectations had started to build during preceding months that the PPCR could fund the adaptation 
options that the NAPA identified, but statements made by the MDBs during the Gorkana workshop 
indicated that this would not be the case. This led to suggestions that the PPCR was not 'building on 
national priorities' (seen to be identified through the NAPA process) and that the process was 'Bank 
led not country led'.34 The emphasis placed on climate resilience as 'climate proofing existing 
investments' led to some reactions on behalf of Government stakeholders that the "Banks are trying 
to climate proof their own projects and not Government priorities".35  
 
However, responses from the MDBs and development partners suggest that these tensions were 
based on misunderstandings over the purpose of this first mission, and also conflicting perspectives 
over whether the remit of the PPCR could enable PPCR to fund NAPA priorities. For example, one 
MDB representative stated that the purpose of the first mission was to get an understanding of the 
national climate change resilience gaps at the policy level, particularly in relation to what the key 
technical assistance gaps were and not  to 'nail down the PPCR then and there'. This statement is 
supported by the stated objectives for the PPCR mission.   
 
In light of these tensions, efforts were made to clarify the purpose of the workshop and the 
relationship between the PPCR and the NAPA.  A statement on the relationship between the PPCR 
and NAPA was drafted with the Government of Nepal stakeholders and went through several 
iterations between the Government and the MDBs. However, a final version was never formally 
approved by the Government as an addendum to the Mission Aide Memoire, but remained an 
informal document for clarification.  
 
The following six days of the joint mission involved the drafting of an Aide Memoire based on the 
outputs of the Gorkana Workshop; meetings with sector agencies to identify technical assistance 
needs; presenting findings and obtaining feedback; and finalising the Aide Memoire with the 
Ministry of Environment.  In response to the unease generated during the Gorkana workshop, the 
MDBs and donor stakeholders were keen that the process of drafting and agreeing the aide 
memoire be used to resolve some of the tensions and clarify confusions that had emerged. The 
resulting  Aide Memoire underwent several changes in response to Government comments, and  
includes the following two statements that respond in particular to the issues discussed above:36 
 
 Synergies between NAPA and PPCR: As the NAPA is under preparation in Nepal there is an 
opportunity to bring the PPCR together in terms of linking analysis, prioritisation and future 
investments...There is also scope to build a joint stakeholder consultation process. An output of NAPA 
is a document that identifies priorities capacity building activities and investments related to 
adaptation. The NAPA guidelines also indicate that NAPAs can include priorities that ensure 
development is climate resilient. Where projects identified in the NAPA are consistent with the 
objectives of the PPCR, these, among other initiatives, should be financed through PPCR resources.  
 
Employing bottom-up initiatives ...emerged as a crucial theme to building resilience...this view, 
strongly held by government, was reiterated at the focus group workshops and meetings organised 
separately for development partners, NGOs, prove sector and the constituent assembly. 
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 NAPA TWG representative  
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 MOE representative 
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 ADB/IFC/World Bank - Government of Nepal, 2009. Draft Aide Memoire: Multilateral Development Bank 
(MDB) Programming Mission for the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, September 3-9, 2009. 
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Nevertheless a news article published in December 2009 suggests that some of these underlying 
tensions persisted: 
 
One of the main issues, sources within both the government and donor agencies said, has been who 
should be on the driving seat. "It was thought to be and should have been a government driven 
programme", they said, "But what happened was missions of World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank would just fly in and hold meetings the way they wished to...Sources with some bilateral 
agencies contributing to the programme fund say there have also been big differences on how to 
utilise the money. "The banks, for instance, were using the money for climate proofing the projects 
they are involved in where as the basic idea was to help communities really vulnerable to climate 
change", they said. 37 
 
It is not clear whether this article was based on more recent or outdated statements from the 
Government and donors.  Nevertheless it suggests that the issue of Government ownership is a 
sensitive one.  
 
Between November 23rd-26th ADB and the World Bank met with MOE and the NAPA thematic 
working group focal persons to follow-up on the September joint programming mission. A meeting 
was also held among MOE, the National Planning Commission (NPC), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and the Prime Minister's Office, to discuss institutional arrangements for the PPCR. It was agreed 
that MOE would continue to coordinate the process but that NPC, PMO and MOF will provide overall 
policy coordination among line agencies and higher level policy guidance; and that the Government 
would form an advisory group chaired by NPC to guide on prioritisation and resource allocation.  
 
During this time it was also agreed that a greater degree of constant interaction between the MDBs 
and the Government was needed to find clarity on the PPCR process. Both the Government and the 
MDBs agreed that the Government needed to be constantly engaged with the drafting and shaping 
of the PPCR, but that they also need support to be able to do this, rather than simply 'handing the 
task over' to the Banks.  The result was an agreement to contract a consulting team of national and 
international consultants, to be based in the Ministry of Environment, to work with the Ministry on 
producing the first draft of the SPCR. The consultants would be contracted by ADB but, significantly, 
supervised by the Ministry of Environment and would be expected to be part of the MOE PPCR 
team.38 Between September 2009 and March 2010 a proposal for accelerated funding for phase 1 
activities was developed that focused on meeting this requirement.   
 
The fast-track funding proposal requests USD 1.5 million in SPCR Technical Assistance (TA) to be 
released in two tranches. The first of these is a request for USD 225,000 immediately (as 'fast track') 
to support this consulting assistance to prepare the SPCR funding documents for both the second 
phase of TA and the program phase.  This was accepted at the meeting of the PPCR Sub-Committee 
on 6th March 2010. The recruitment of one international and three national consultants began. 
TORs were drafted jointly between the MDBs and MOE to ensure the resulting candidates met the 
requirements of both. Candidates were shortlisted by the MDBs but in cooperation with MOE, to 
those who met the specific requirements of the TORs. Final selection of consultants was by joint 
decision between the MOE and the MDBs.39 The national consultants begin work in May 2010 and 
the international team leader joined the team in June 2010. They were tasked to prepare the SPCR 
preparatory document according to the Government's expectations taking into consideration the 
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 "Tough Lessons". Ekantipur, December 4th 2009.  
38
 Interview with MDB representative 
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 PPCR/SC.5/5. Nepal: Proposal for accelerated funding for phase 1 activities. Meeting of the PPCR Sub-
Committee, Manila, Philippines March 16, 2010. 
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requirements of, and guidelines issued by, the PPCR subcommittee. In addition, a private sector 
consultant was recruited in September 2010 to work alongside the SPCR team with a focus on 
private sector engagement.  
 
An SPCR Inception and Consultation Workshop was held on 6th July 2010. The workshop was 
attended by over 100 participants from a wide range of Government, NGO, donor, MDB  and private 
sector stakeholders including good representation from the NAPA TWGs.  The opening session of the 
workshop was taken by MOE who highlighted the near completion of the NAPA draft, presented 
initial NAPA process and priorities and stressed that the PPCR process should build on the progress 
of the NAPA. The following technical sessions were undertaken by MOE and ADB consultants who 
outlined the proposal for PPCR preparation. MOE also proposed that the SPCR use a similar 
implementation framework as that presented in the NAPA document (see figure 2).  
 
During the technical session taken by ADB, principles for guiding Nepal's SPCR process were 
highlighted. Two in particular addressed ongoing concerns from the Government on climate change 
investments in general, and the PPCR in particular. First, the consultants confirmed that 80% of PPCR 
financing would go straight to vulnerable communities for "on the ground activities to address risk in 
vulnerable communities". This figure of 80% of financing 'for implementation on the ground' has 
been a key Government demand for all recent large investments in adaptation in Nepal, including 
the NAPA and the more recent DfID/EU investments. Second, the consultants addressed the 
relationship between PPCR and NAPA. They reiterated that the PPCR should 'build on NAPA', and 
specifically the SPCR planning process would: 
 Build on reports of TWGs 
 Utilise NAPA institutional frameworks to formulate SPCR. 
 
The same presentation also sought to clarify the difference between the PPCR and NAPA processes, 
stating: 
 
NAPAs are intended to cover urgent and immediate needs for adaptation whereas the PPCR 
is focused on longer term goals of achieving development that is climate resilient.40 
 
The ADB consultants also outlined a proposed methodology for the SPCR prioritisation planning 
process. They suggested that the key steps included: 
i. Assessment of climate change risks 
ii. Identification of vulnerable communities 
iii. Adaptive capacity assessment 
iv. Identification of priority interventions to address risks 
v. Resilience assessment 
vi. Cost benefit analysis and return on investment analysis (for private sector loan 
components).  
 
It was proposed that TWGs be engaged in every step. It was highlighted that the assessment of 
climate change risks would build on the initial work undertaken during the NAPA preparation 
process especially in relation to setting the context of climate change risks and analysing sectoral 
hazards. However, it was suggested that a more detailed analysis was needed to that undertaken 
under the NAPA for the estimating and evaluating of climate change risks.  
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 Developing Nepal's Strategic Program for Climate Resilience. Presentation by ADB consultants to the 
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It was proposed that estimating and evaluating climate change risks required a greater level of 
analysis to identify the event and outcome risks to specific sectors and also to identify the most 
vulnerable communities to those hazards. It was suggested that this analysis would be done in 
Kathmandu by TWGs with training and support from the PPCR team, utilising climate change 
knowledge (including models) and expert judgement. Once key climate risks and vulnerable 
communities had been identified, it was proposed that fieldwork be undertaken to the vulnerable 
communities by PPCR teams and TWGs to illicit local evidence and indigenous knowledge to 
combine with expert judgement in the assessment of key climate change community risks.   
 
Next, it was suggested that an "adaptive capacity assessment" would need to be undertaken at the 
local level (using criteria defined centrally by the PPCR and TWG teams), at the sectoral level and at 
the national level. Based on the outputs of these steps, priority needs/investments should be 
identified "viable for vulnerable communities, within vulnerable sectors, and at the national level".41 
These priority SPCR measures would then be evaluated through a "resiliency assessment...to 
determine whether the proposed measures will enhance resilience within vulnerable ecosystems, 
communities, sectors or at the national level".42 The resiliency assessment assesses proposed 
interventions against their potential to address exposure, sensitivity, adaptive capacity, and whether 
the interventions also have a positive impact on development factors related to vulnerability such as 
social capital, the quality of basic services, and the resilience of natural resources or essential 
environmental services. Finally, a cost benefit analysis would be undertaken.  
 
The proposed activities and work plan presented by the ADB consultants in conjunction with the 
Government represent a response to some of the key concerns of the Government around the PPCR 
process. These include a recognition of the need to incorporate 'bottom-up' risk assessments; a 
commitment to ensure 80% of funds for PPCR are channelled 'on to the ground'; and the need to 
build on the NAPA process and clarify the relationship between the NAPA and PPCR.  
 
Nevertheless discussions following the presentations suggest that there remained some confusion 
again around the relationship between the PPCR and the NAPA. For example, the workshop report 
states that the comments included:43 
 
"It seems to be that what we have already achieved in NAPA is going to repeat again." 
 
"As NAPA has already identified projects, please just select some of them and do risk and cost benefit 
analysis and do the job soon." 
 
"There are so many confusing terminologies...NAPA team conducted in-depth vulnerability 
assessment. Focusing on risk assessment and focusing on exposure seem like reducing vulnerability. 
PPCR is to mainstream climate change related issues into development processes." 
 
"Are we repeating the same? Why not select a project from the NAPA list and proceed ahead...Let it 
not be parallel to NAPA."  
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On July 7th, 2010, a review meeting took place to review the outcomes of the PPCR Inception 
Workshop between the MDBs, the Government, and the NAPA team. This meeting re-emphasised 
that the starting point for PPCR preparation would be the NAPA, and confirmed the work plan 
presented in the previous day's workshop. However, interviews with meeting participants suggested 
that tensions remained over how "building on NAPA" was being interpreted. The proposed 'next 
step' to SPCR planning was to summarise NAPA TWG reports, and working with TWGs to identify 
vulnerable communities for field assessments, based on the outputs of these summaries and TWG 
expert opinion.  
 
However, it was pointed out that part of the NAPA process had involved the commissioning of a 
study to map vulnerable communities already and that these communities had already been taken 
as the Government's climate vulnerability priorities. Developing a new approach to define 
vulnerable communities and climate change priorities was seen by Government stakeholders to 
undermine the NAPA process and the extensive range of stakeholders that had been engaged in this. 
However, one participant notes that "the general message is that the NAPA process cannot be 
justified/validated as per PPCR guidelines".44  
 
Discussions over the following week seem to have gone some way to resolving these tensions. A 
week later, a PPCR Partners Meeting was held at the Ministry of Environment on July 14th, 
attended by Government, MDB, donor and multilateral stakeholders. The meeting was opened by 
the Ministry of Environment, and opening remarks included clarifications on the relationship 
between the SPCR and NAPA, with the meeting report stating that,45  
 
[MOE] indicated that a Climate Change Risk Assessment, Adaptive Capacity Assessment, and 
Cost-benefit Analysis were not part of the NAPA process, and these were to be undertaken 
as part of the SPCR process in accordance with the PPCR guidelines. 
  
And,  
 
Clarified that the NAPA prioritised projects will also be considered when prioritising possible 
PPCR projects. 
 
This last statement does not state that the PPCR can fund NAPA, but that PPCR priorities will take 
into account the priorities of NAPA. This is a shift from the first Aide Memoire which stated that 
where projects are consistent with the objectives of the PPCR these could be considered for PPCR 
financing.46  
 
During August and September 2010, the PPCR team and selected members of the TWGs undertook 
the risk assessment and adaptive capacity assessment phases of work, including fieldwork 
undertaken in 18 vulnerable communities in six prioritised districts. Risk assessment workshops were 
held at the district level with high level local government and community representatives and invited 
experts to identify three priority communities in each district. Within each community, household 
surveys and interviews were undertaken to give a "feel for" adaptive capacity.  
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The 'three tier' (national, district and community level) adaptive capacity assessment outputs were 
combined with the vulnerability assessment analysis (including that undertaken by the NAPA) to give 
rise to a draft list of priority investment areas. These included:47 
i. Water-related priorities: water basin management plans were identified as needed and 
interventions at the community level were suggested to show how to manage water and 
connectivity issues along a watershed. 
ii. Upgrading hydro and meteorology stations to provide better information and early warning 
services to communities  
iii. A large capacity building component to build climate change risk management into 
operations across scales, including at village level and municipality level and up to sectoral 
and national government levels. This would require the production of manuals on climate 
proofing as well as training.  
iv. Addressing climate change risks to critical threatened species particularly the snow leopard 
and the rhinoceros. Biodiversity is often overlooked in the PPCR  but this was raised as  a 
critical issue in Nepal  - there is a need to climate-proof conservation plans through on-the-
ground monitoring and conservation undertaken by communities.  
v. Microfinance and micro insurance: Farmers in remote rural areas have no access to these 
services because the government does not have the coverage to reach these excluded 
areas, and the private sector does not yet see the business case. There are opportunities for 
public/private partnerships to capitalise a micro-finance/micro-insurance scheme. 
vi. Research and development into climate-resilient seeds and dissemination to vulnerable 
communities, again through public/private partnerships; 
vii. Low cost multiple use emergency shelters in response to the high losses suffered during 
extreme weather events 
 
At the time the suggestions were put forward the Government had not yet decided whether it would 
accept the grant-only component of the PPCR (totalling USD50 million), or whether to also take the 
concessional loan allocation (providing an additional USD 60 million). Suggestions 1-4 would be 
financed through a grant component of the PPCR, while suggestions 5-7 were deemed more suitable 
for loan financing.  
 
These suggestions were presented by the PPCR team on October 5th, 2010 to Ministry of 
Environment and MDB stakeholders. The Minister for Environment noted he was pleased with the 
level of work and detail that had been presented and noted the attention to the private sector that 
had so far been overlooked.48  Over the following weeks the comments from the Government as 
well as wider stakeholder consultations were collated and used to draft an SPCR proposal that would 
be presented at the next Joint Mission (see below). Four draft components were agreed on that 
would form the basis of consultation at the next Joint mission. These were: 
i. Building Climate Resilient Watershed and Water Resources in Mountain Eco-regions.49 
Outputs include: 
  Communities who already have watershed management plans implement quick 
actions to build resilience 
 Communities and ecosystems in selected mountain watersheds (identified as 
significantly vulnerable to water scarcity due to climate change) have improved 
physical and economic resilience to changes in availability of water for domestic, 
agricultural and environmental use.  
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ii. Building Resilience to Climate-related Extreme Events50. The objective of this component is to 
build resilience in vulnerable communities by establishing early warning systems and 
improving access to financial instruments that reduce the adverse impacts of climate 
induced shocks. Outputs include: 
 Installing real-time hydro meteorological infrastructure and information nation-wide 
and establish early warning systems for priority vulnerable communities. 
 Establish climate risk insurance/finance programme for vulnerable communities, 
home-owners and women. 
 
iii. Mainstreaming Climate Change Risk Management in Development.51 This SCR intervention 
will facilitate the integration of climate change risk management into development planning 
by developing climate change risk management guidelines and procedures and 
implementing a comprehensive programme of capacity building for climate change risk 
management at the national, sectoral, district and local levels, targeting public sector and 
civil society and also private sector.  
 
iv. Building Climate Resilient Communities through Private Sector Participation.52 The 
programme objective is to strengthen capacity, improve access to climate resilient 
technologies, and reduce key market barriers that prevent the private sector from playing a 
key role in building climate resilient communities. This objective will be achieved through a 
financing envelope of both concessional loans and grants that would support building 
climate resilient communities through private sector participation. The grant element will be 
primarily used for capacity development, covering the incremental costs of integrating 
climate risks and increasing awareness of climate risks among the private sector. Activities 
under this component support private sector engagement in the SPCR components 1, 2 and 
3 above.  
 
On November 12th 2010 there was a CIF meeting in Washington to which the focal points of all 
PPCR countries were invited to attend to present on their progress. Unfortunately there was some 
confusion resulting in the missing of the deadline for MOE to submit a proposal to present at this 
meeting, so MOE only confirmed their attendance last minute. This caused frustrations and 
uncertainty about the MOE focal points availability for the next PPCR join mission that had been 
planned for the following week (see below). It was suggested that communication should be better 
coordinated between central CIF offices, country implementing agencies and country focal points as 
there was a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities for communication with central CIF 
counterparts.  
 
The Government of Nepal did attend the CIF meeting in Washington and shared experiences with 
other countries. During this meeting the Government of Nepal became convinced to accept the loan 
component of the PPCR, in light of experiences in other countries, specifically Niger and Bangladesh, 
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who were also accepting the loan component.53 This meant that the funds available for SPCR now 
totalled USD110 million.54 
 
The next World Bank, ADB and IFC Joint Mission took place between November 15th and 21st.  The 
purpose of the Joint Mission was to consult with a wide range of government, donor and civil society 
stakeholders on the four draft SPCR component concept notes (see above). The key actions agreed 
were:55 
 
i) Financial envelope56 
 
The Government proposed a financial request to the PPCR of USD 110, requesting USD 50 million in 
grants and USD60 million in concessional loans, with the Government to provide final guidance 
during the next mission. Private sector participation would be channelled both directly through the 
IFC and through public-private partnership. Indicative allocation for the four components total 
USD108 million which does not include the necessary funds for project preparation, MDB admin fees 
and overall SPCR programme management.57  
 
Also during the mission, the development partners and representatives raised the possibility of 
establishing a multi-donor trust fund for climate change activities in Nepal through which PPCR trust 
funds could be channelled. The mission concluded however that there was not enough time in the 
PPCR preparation process and that creating such a fund was not in the mandate for the PPCR.58 
Nevertheless it was agreed that the MDBs would continue a discussion with other donor partners on 
the possibility of creating such a trust fund, potentially through one of the other donor programmes 
on climate change being initiated in Nepal, and that if this was the case the PPCR investments would 
be aligned with this mechanism.59  
 
ii) SPCR components 
 
The aide memoire suggests that focused consultations on the four components of the SPCR 
described above confirmed that they address all priority needs identified by both the NAPA and the 
SPCR; that they were accepted as rational, feasible and not duplicative of ongoing activities, and that 
many synergies existed between SPCR proposals and ongoing climate change activities.60  
 
In addition, the mission also held preliminary discussions with the MoFSC and UNDP concerning the 
possibility of an addition standalone SPCR component to ensure the sustainability of certain 
endangered specific in the context of climate change. UNDP is in the process of finalising a proposal 
for the submission of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) for biodiversity corridor management 
including endangered species. The mission agreed to explore whether CIF/PPCR funds could be 
allocated to UNDP directly to supplement this proposed project to ensure adequate focus under the 
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GEF-supported project to risks resulting from climate change, for example degrading or shifting 
habitats and changing food chains. Discussions around this component are ongoing.  
 
iii) Tentative institutional structure 
 
The institutional structure of the PPCR had been a site of contestation in the SPCR design process. 
The Government (MOE) indicated that the PPCR should be in line with the same institutional 
structure proposed under NAPA. Confusions arose around the fund-flow mechanism proposed by 
the PPCR (that was proposed to go through the Ministry of Finance, guided through a  PPCR steering 
committee), which the Government at first perceived as incompatible with a NAPA-type institutional 
structure for implementation.61  
 
This issue underwent extensive negotiation between the Government (including Ministry of Finance, 
MOE, and NPC), MDBs and donors.  The final aide memoire suggests a structure that is in line with 
that proposed under NAPA, that is also supported by the DfID/EU programme of investment (see 
section 3). Under this structure, the implementation of the SPCR has been proposed as follows (See 
figure 4) : 
 Components 1-3 will be implemented through designated project management units, with 
component committees chaired by secretaries of the respective component lead agencies.  
 For component 4, implementation will be conducted through IFC procedures. 
 A climate change programme steering committee will monitor results and provide overall 
coordination and guidance of all climate change programs, including NAPA, DFID/EU and 
SPCR. This steering committee will be chaired by MOE and co-chaired by NPC, supported by 
a secretariat staffed by MOE.  
 The secretariat will provide regular updates to the Climate Change Council  and the MCCICC.  
 The current institutional mechanism of the PPCR steering committee and a Policy Advisory 
Committee will continue until the new SOCR implementation arrangements are established.  
 
 iv) Government counterpart staffing 
 
The mission requested the Government of Nepal to fill vacant positions in the Ministry of 
Environment to help meet the increasing human capacity gap in light of the new demands of the 
sizable climate change investment programmes beginning in Nepal.  
 
These outputs of the Mission were drafted into the Joint Mission 15th-21st November Aide Memoire  
that was agreed by the Government of Nepal on December 10th, 2010. This was a week later than 
planned, however this delay was attributed both by the Government and the MDBs to the additional 
time needed for the Government to fully internalise and approve the content of the Aide Memoire 
in light of other commitments (including COP16), and not because of any reluctance to approve the 
document.   
 
A forward plan of follow-up actions from this point until the next joint mission is presented in Table 
2. The next Joint Mission is currently planned for February 9th-18th, and during which time the 
Technical Assistance proposal for the SPCR may also be approved.62 63 
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The following section will review some of the key points and issues of negotiation from the PPCR 
development process described above. 
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Table 1: Next Steps in PPCR Preparation  
Source: Joint Mission Aide Memoire 15th-21st November 2010 
 
Milestone Due Date 
Mission Follow-up  
 MOE to consolidate stakeholder comments and submit to MDBs 23rd December 2010 
 National Planning Commission to convene meeting of PPCR Policy and 
Advisory Committee  
31st December 2010 
SPCR Technical Assistance tasks  
 ADB consultant economist will deliver a short research paper documenting 
annual estimates for a recent representative year that reflect national level 
costs incurred due to i) water variability and drought related crop losses; ii) 
weather-related road repairs; and iii) flood damages 
32st December 
Component 3: Climate Risk Management TA  
 MOE, with assistance from the SPCR TA team, to revise concept paper to 
incorporate feedback received during the workshop, and add 
implementation plan, itemized cost estimate, and initial draft consulting 
terms of reference 
15th January 2011 
 MOE to engage with other relevant ministries, departments, NGOs, and 
development partners to take stock of ongoing programs/TAs to avoid 
overlaps/build synergies with the activities for the proposed component 
15th January 2011 
 MOE to review ongoing related TAs and discussion among all relevant 
stakeholders of the lessons learned from those TAs and ways to build on 
current TA findings in the preparation and implementation of Component 3 
During February 2011 
joint mission 
 World Bank to begin assessment of MOEs capacity in financial management, 
taking into consideration Nepal's finance laws, and roles and responsibilities 
of related institutions, based on the experience of the ongoing TA and to 
report its preliminary assessment during the next joint mission 
Starting 15th January 
2011 
 MOE to prepare a plan for achieving the expected SPCR TA results in 
interagency coordination 
26th January 2011 
Possible Component 5 on Endangered Species Biodiversity  
 MOE with assistance of the TA team to draft initial concept paper on 
biodiversity conservation and livelihoods, in collaboration with MoFSC, 
MoAC and UNDP 
30th November 2010 
Preparations for February 2011 Mission  
 MDBs to send MOE draft mission schedule 14th January 2011 
 MOE to finalise mission schedule 21st January 2011 
 MOE to issue invitations for mission meetings 23rd January 2011 
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4. Negotiation  
 
As shown in the discussion above, the PCCR process in Nepal has opened up many new (and some 
old) issues for negotiation, and created new sites for these issues, and the institutions that govern 
them, to be contested. This section will expand discussions around three key issues introduced 
above that provided sites for negotiation or contestation.  
 
4.1 The relationship between the NAPA and the PPCR 
 
The first and perhaps main issue of contention and repeated renegotiation during the PPCR 
development process has been the relationship between the NAPA and the PPCR. The root of this 
tension stems from the challenges experienced by NAPA projects in other LDCs to secure funding for 
NAPA priorities.  Nepal was one of the last countries to complete its NAPA, and as such placed a 
great deal of emphasis on 'learning from the experience of others.'64 These lessons included the 
need to look beyond LDC Fund options for funding NAPA priorities, and therefore to: 
 
Strategically align the NAPA with other national climate change and development processes 
to ensure effective mainstreaming and rapid follow-up to implementation of adaptation 
projects.65 
 
The NAPA document states that,  
 
The Government's intention is that the prioritisation process for the NAPA is comprehensive 
enough to be used as a basis for the development of an adaptation strategy that will be able 
to draw on financial resources for implementation from various global, multilateral and 
bilateral sources.66 
 
From the perspective of the Ministry of Environment, the PPCR process, which at its inception did 
not yet have any precedent in place in not funding NAPAs, and specific requirements to build on 
NAPAs, presented an obvious opportunity for follow-up funding. These expectations were fuelled by 
statements made by various stakeholders at the NAPA Inception Workshop in May 200967 implying 
this could be the case where NAPA priorities met PPCR objectives (see section 3).  
 
This resulted in disappointment from the Government of Nepal at the strong negative reaction of 
the MDBs to this proposal at the first Joint Mission to the PPCR in September 2009.  This tension was 
recognised by the MDBs and somewhat managed by the way in which the SPCR development has 
(commendably) explicitly built on NAPA in its development, through the engagement of the NAPA 
TWGs, the repeated referencing of the NAPA throughout the PPCR inception documents, and the 
use of NAPA-generated information as 'background' to the SPCR processes.  
 
However, members of civil society and also from within the NAPA team suggest that this is not 
enough. This dissatisfaction comes from a perceived lack of delivery of promises made during the 
first Joint Mission, in which the draft Aide Memoire stated that “where projects identified in the 
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NAPA are consistent with the objectives of the PPCR, these, among other initiatives, should be 
financed through PPCR resources.”68 
 
The MDBs and SPCR team suggest that the NAPA priorities do not meet the objectives of the PPCR; 
but there are questions over whether the PPCR priorities identified during the SPCR process are any 
more closely matched to the PPCR objectives that those from the NAPA. Initially it was argued that 
the NAPA could not meet the PPCR objectives because NAPAs give rise to adaptation projects, while 
the PPCR objectives are about "long term and strategic resilience building", that is "mainstreamed" 
and "programmatic".69 Yet, as will be elaborated in the next section, the “Expanded NAPA” process 
explicitly moves away from projectised adaptation towards more strategic adaptation planning. 
Further, there are strong synergies between some of the NAPA priorities and the first three PPCR 
priorities:  
 
These are presented in table 2:  
PPCR proposed component NAPA Priority  
Component 1: Building climate resilience of 
watersheds and water resources in mountain 
eco-regions 
Priority 1: Promoting community-based 
adaptation through integrated management of 
agriculture, water and forest and biodiversity 
sector  
Priority 8: empowering vulnerable communities 
through sustainable management of water 
resources and clean energy supply  
Component 2: Building resilience to climate-
related extreme events  
Priority 3: Community-based disaster 
management for facilitating climate adaptation 
Priority 4: GLOF monitoring and disaster risk 
reduction  
Component 3: Mainstreaming climate change 
risk management in development  
Expanded NAPA components of Climate Change 
Knowledge Management and Learning Platform; 
and Multi-stakeholder Framework for Action   
 
 
The NAPA/PPCR debate also reflects a wider debate about 'Government ownership' of the PCPR 
process in Nepal. The NAPA is now a government-approved document. Although there were 
guidelines for NAPA preparation, these were very flexible and the Government was able to shape 
the process significantly, mobilising donor financing in order to ensure a shift towards a more 
strategic and programmatic approach to adaptation planning. The MOE was familiar with the NAPA 
process from the outset, because it is an active member of the Least Developed Countries Expert 
Group, and has observed many other LDCs conduct their own NAPAs. The MOE was therefore 
relatively comfortable with the NAPA remit, and how it could be driven.  
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The PPCR, however, is a new process, for both the MDBs and the recipient Governments. There are 
no precedents from which to learn.  From the perception of the Government there was not clarity 
from the outset about how far the Government should shape the still-evolving process,70  which is 
likely to have been enhanced by the conflicting messages from donors and MDBs about the extent 
to which the PPCR could 'fund NAPAs.' The fact that the Government's preference for using PPCR 
money to fund NAPA was not accepted has resulted in the sense that Government ownership is 
undermined in two ways; first, because the preference of the Government is not accepted; and 
second, because this preference was to build on a 'government led' process.  
 
4.2 Institutional and financial governance of the PPCR for managing climate change 
 
Another related point of negotiation in the development of the SPCR is around the institutional and 
financial mechanism for its management. As shown in section 2, there are currently three large-scale 
programmes of work in Nepal that aim to support an institutional and financial structure for climate 
change governance in Nepal: The NAPA (being one of the only NAPAs to include an implementation 
strategy that outlines how and by whom the NAPA programme for work could be implemented); the 
DfID/EU Nepal Climate Change Support Programme (NCCSP) that aims to support a national 
institutional framework and financing mechanism to manage climate finance and to channel 
resources to local, district and sub-regional levels; and the PPCR. The need to coordinate the three 
processes to avoid a proliferation of potential climate change institutional structures is perhaps 
inherent, but is also laid out in the Donor Compact on Climate Change to which all the supporting 
donors for these three programmes of work are signatory.  
 
However, the development of common institutional design structure for these three programmes of 
work has been a key issue of negotiation, partly because of the different interests and incentives of 
the actors involved, but also partly because of confusions in how these different interests were 
communicated. For example, the focus of the DfID/EU and the PPCR programmes of work are 
different - but not incompatible. There was general consensus from stakeholders that the two 
programmes of work were largely complementary, with DfID/EU focusing on lower scale delivery 
mechanisms of NAPA and other climate change programmes, while PPCR aims to support higher 
level climate change mainstreaming at the sectoral and national levels. So, for example, if the 
DfID/EU programme of work is using 'bottom-up' local adaptation plans to identify issues within 
watersheds, the PPCR would be coming from the 'top-down' to work with the Ministry responsible 
for those issues within that watershed to develop a watershed management plan that could then 
support what would be implemented on the ground.71  Nevertheless this means the focus of the 
institutional frameworks under each programme is slightly different - DfID/EU is focused on 
coordination of local planning, while MDBs are focused on higher level coordination for example of 
different sectors.  
 
 A key issue for negotiation was the role of the Ministry of Environment vis-à-vis other Ministries.  
The NAPA implementation framework (see figure 1) was the Government's preference as the 
starting point for the implementation of all adaptation interventions and investments in Nepal.72 On 
the diagram presented in figure one, the Ministry of Environment is positioned at the top, 
underneath the Policy and Advisory bodies of the Climate Change Council and the National Planning 
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Commission. However, because of the way the diagram is drawn, the policy and advisory bodies 
appear to the side, with the MOE taking the central and overarching governance role.   
 
This structure with MOE playing such a central position raised initial concerns for the MDBs, because 
it is not clear from the diagram how fiduciary standards will be managed. As noted in interviews with 
several MDB actors and consultants, the MOE is a relatively junior Ministry that is now taking a 
senior central coordination role around climate change activity. Yet to date the Ministry has not had 
the opportunity to demonstrate its capacity in this pivotal coordination role. At the same time, the 
PPCR programme as a 'pilot' scheme has to demonstrate lessons and results quickly, which does not 
provide incentives for taking new risks on administrative structures when the programme itself is 
already new and unprecedented.  
 
Instead, the incentives are directed towards maintaining low fiduciary and management risks, which 
lean towards the engagement of the Ministries of Finance and NPC with whom the banks are used to 
working with in a higher level role. The MDBs also pointed out that while climate change has raised 
the profile of MOE significantly, there remain important issues of Government protocol that need to 
be kept in mind; senior ministries carry more weight in Government than junior ones, and this is 
important for the PPCR to achieve its goal of mainstreaming climate change and achieving 
“transformational change” across sectors.  
 
Another issue of negotiation was that of financial flow.  From the PPCR perspective, fund flow comes 
from two envelopes - the loan component and the grant component. The loan component might go 
straight to the private sector; and there might also be another 'package' of grants and loans for the 
Government. In line with common practice of the MDBs and also most donors, this money would 
flow through the Ministry of Finance, and under this a PPCR programme steering committee would 
manage how this money was disbursed - i.e. fund flow and fiduciary accountability will go straight to 
Programme or Project Management Units.  This mechanism was initially presented to the 
Government as part of the management framework and caused considerable confusion on behalf of 
the Government, and MOE in particular, who felt that their role as coordinating agency was being 
undermined.  
 
This confusion has since been clarified through ongoing efforts by the MDBs, donors and PPCR 
consultants to work through the potentially confusing range of options with the different 
government line ministries to ensure that the Government plays a significant role in deciding on 
appropriate options that can meet the needs of all stakeholders. These discussions  also led to the 
proposal of a possible 'trust fund' as a longer term goal, through which the Government can look 
into self financing schemes to take greater ownership of climate change financing and to reduce 
dependency on the PPCR as part of a process of 'transformational change' (see section 5). This 
proposal was supported by ADB and DfID and is in line with other ADB Technical Assistance 
programmes in Nepal.  
 
However, it was eventually decided that this was beyond the mandate of the PPCR  preparation 
process73 but that this is something that could be taken on under one of the other donor 
programmes of work and that if this was the case the PPCR investments would be aligned with this 
mechanism.74 Yet, a trust-fund mechanism could potentially provide a high-level platform from 
which the Government manages funds down to investments, increasing the capacity and autonomy 
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of the Government to manage adaptation investments, in line with  “transformational change” 
objectives. Therefore such a mechanism is not outside the mandate of the PPCR.  
 
4.3 Loans versus grants 
 
Another area of negotiations around financial issues was around the question of 'loans versus 
grants'. As noted, the PPCR offers funding in both loan and grant form. This proved a controversial 
point in the establishment of the CIFs, because of the principle that funding for adaptation finance 
should be 'additional' to development funding because climate change is an additional burden to 
existing development stresses. Climate finance is also provided on the basis of 'compensation' - 
developed countries are committed to paying the additional costs of adaptation to developing 
countries because of their relative historic responsibility for causing climate change, and these 
payments therefore represent should compensation to developing countries who suffer 
disproportionately from the impacts.  Requiring developing countries to take loans to finance their 
own adaptation clearly goes against these principles.  
 
However, because the PCPR was established outside the UNFCCC, donors have contributed funds 
through both grants and highly concessional loans.   Countries applying to the PPCR for funds are 
able to apply for both the loan and grant component; or the grant component only, depending on 
their needs. When Nepal was first invited to apply for the PPCR, there was a strong feeling from 
within the Ministry of Environment that the Government would only accept grant funding. 
Interviews with MOE stated at the time that this was because Nepal should not be taking loan 
money for adaptation 'on principle', and that this could set a bad precedent in international forums 
for funding adaptation through loan mechanisms.  
 
From the perspective of the MDBs, this reluctance to accept the loan component of the PPCR was 
coming from the MOE only and did not represent the overall Government opinion. It was suggested 
that MoF and NPC could see the value in taking highly concessional soft loans for investments that 
could potentially generate revenue, such as microfinance, where as MOE were reluctant because of 
a misconception that they would be under pressure to demonstrate revenue generation from all 
projects under the PPCR. The MDBs also felt that the PPCR did not represent loans financing for 
adaptation', but for 'climate resilient development' (see section 5).  
 
The decision to take the loan75 as well as the grant component was made by the Government 
following their trip to Washington to the CIF meeting in November 2010 (see section 3). During this 
meeting, the Government of Nepal met with other CIF pilot country teams, and learned that other 
countries, notably Bangladesh and Niger, would be accepting the loan component. Interviews with 
MOE suggested that this convinced the Government that they would not be setting a precedent for 
loan financing for adaptation. Further, the Ministry suggests that accepting highly concessional loans 
is a practical solution to financing more resilience-building activities that would otherwise not be 
funded.  The MDBs suggested that the meeting had provided an opportunity for the MOE to better 
understand how a loan component could be used, and that the loans were highly concessional and 
'soft', reducing the pressure felt by MOE to meet the requirements of repayment from all projects.  
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The negotiation over grants versus loans again represents an issue over which the Government of 
Nepal, and the MOE in particular, felt a strong need to be able to control.  The perceived pressure 
from the MDBs to accept 'loans for adaptation' was taken as a clear indication that he MDBs were 
not supporting a principle that was important to the MOE, especially in light of Nepal's active 
position in the LDC Expert Group under the UNFCCC, and its bid to develop a Mountain Alliance of 
vulnerable mountainous countries to climate change. While this issue was eventually resolved, much 
of the tension generated around this negotiation could have potentially been avoided with earlier 
clarity and sensitivity towards a principle that was important to the MOE.   
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5. Conceptualisation 
 
The negotiation of the key issues above was closely tied in with the different and sometimes 
conflicting ways in which these concepts were conceptualised by different stakeholders.    
 
5.1 Climate resilience, adaptation, and adaptive capacity 
 
First, confusion over the precise remits of the NAPA and the PPCR, and therefore the relationship 
between them, can be traced back to how different stakeholders perceive 'climate resilience' and 
'adaptation.' From the perspectives of the PPCR consulting team, "adaptation" as defined under the 
NAPA refers to "urgent and immediate adaptation needs", and is "projectised", where as "climate 
resilience"  is "long term and strategic", " mainstreamed" and "programmatic".76  
 
It is worth noting here that "mainstreamed" is generally taken by this group of stakeholders to refer 
to "climate proofing", and applied to ensuring infrastructure and in some cases policy is robust 
under future climate change scenarios. From this perspective, the focus of "climate proofing" is 
adding to existing measures to make them more resilient to a future climate change. Climate change 
is an additional stressor to development needs and requires additional information and expertise in 
order to manage this.  
 
This interpretation resulted in a strong emphasis under the PPCR of climate change trend analysis 
and climate project information in the analysis of "adaptive capacity". For example, the assessment 
of adaptive capacity under the SPCR preparation in Nepal required the assessment of information 
against: 
 knowledge (including indigenous knowledge) and awareness of climate change risks; 
 awareness of appropriate mechanisms to address climate risks; 
 ability to implement appropriate climate risk management mechanisms as measured by 
access to resources and ability to deploy such resources; 
 ability to implement climate change risk monitoring and continuous improvement.  
 
The focus is on the capacity of communities, sectors or agencies to be more resilient to future 
climate changes. This is well exemplified by the way in which 'progress' against 'adaptive capacity' 
will be monitored and evaluated under the SPCR. The SPCR project document states that, 
 
In order to establish a benchmark against which SPCR interventions will be measured, an 
adaptive capacity assessment will also be done within identified resilient communities for 
the following events - flood, drought, heat, extreme event, climate variability. 
 
This assumes that 'resiliency' can be controlled for, and is a factor of the capacity to respond to 
these five climate-change related impacts. "Adaptive capacity" under the PPCR refers largely to 
"climate risk management capacity".77 
 
The Government and to some extent donors however interpreted adaptation under Nepal's NAPA as 
also long term and strategic, rather than projectised. This is explicit in the way in which cofinancing 
was mobilised in order to ensure a more "programmatic and long term approach" to NAPA 
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preparation. 78 From this perspective, using a distinction between 'adaptation' and 'resilience' as a 
reason for why the PPCR cannot be used to finance NAPA caused a lot of confusion for the 
Government an donor stakeholders; as remarked by one donor, "it's splitting hairs. What's the point 
of adaptation if it is not also long term and strategic?" The Government also felt that the MDB 
definition of adaptation under the NAPA undermined the significant effort that had gone into 
moving away from projectised perceptions of adaptation. As noted by one member of MOE,  
 
"we have learned a lot from other countries NAPA..and [we are] using this learning in the 
Nepal NAPA, to make adaptation part of a longer term strategy, this should be recognised". 
 
However, adaptation, resilience and adaptive capacity are interpreted differently in the way in which 
the NAPA work programme was operationalised. From the NAPA perspective an integrated and 
strategic approach to climate change risk management lies less in 'climate proofing' existing 
development interventions, but more with strengthening those interventions that are most relevant 
for enabling long term response to climate change. This means less emphasis on climate change risks 
and information against these; and more information on what constitutes vulnerability to current 
climate variability. The NAPA process therefore placed less emphasis on climate change information 
in its risk assessment; and focused instead on vulnerability analysis. Therefore in order to fulfil the 
mandate of the PPCR as interpreted by the MDBs - in terms of a 'climate risk management' approach 
to adaptive capacity - there was a need to conduct additional climate risk management assessments 
to that which had already been done under the NAPA process.  
 
5.2 National ownership and a country-driven approach 
 
Different conceptualisations of what constitutes climate change resilience, are closely linked with 
similarly divergent concepts of what 'national ownership'  and a 'country-driven approach' look like. 
From the Government's perspective, if the PPCR is 'country driven', then they should be able to 
define how "climate resilience" is interpreted, especially in light of the fact that there is not yet any 
precedent for PPCR. Under NAPA, factors that contributed to government ownership included the 
capacity of the MOE to interpret the NAPA guidelines and decide on activities in the NAPA 
preparation process;  the Government, rather than the implementing agency, who were ultimately 
accountable for the ‘success’ of the project (because the MOE reported to the Least Development 
Countries Expert Group under the UNFCCCC). Other factors included the Government leadership of 
all TWGs (also employed by the PPCR); and the autonomy of the Government in financial matters 
such as budget management and allocation and procurement.  
 
The PPCR has adopted many of these mechanisms, such as operating through Government-led 
TWGs. However, the MDBs also faced a challenge in enabling the same extent of Government 
ownership over the PPCR as had been afforded in the NAPA.  First, because the PPCR does not fall 
under the UNFCCC, it is the MDBs rather than the countries for whom ultimate accountability rests 
to demonstrate lessons for climate resilience from the pilots.  The MDBs are working on a process 
for which there is not yet any precedent, and they are directly engaging with new administrative 
structures and ministries that do not have senior coordination experience. The precedent that does 
exist is standard donor-recipient relationship and standard MDB management procedures. At the 
same time the MDBs need to demonstrate good results, in a timely way. The incentives for strong 
government ownership are therefore not aligned with those for low fiduciary risk and fast results. 
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In Nepal, this tension was managed through the use of a consulting team, hired in conjunction with 
the Government, whose remit was drafted in close coordination with the Government. The 
consulting team is based in the ministry and was given primary responsibility for the drafting of the 
SPCR, shifting the power away from the MDBs and towards the consulting team. As noted by one 
MDB representative,  
 
Other SPCR processes have tended towards standard Bank practices where Banks draft the 
documents and then go through an iterative process of agreement with Governments and 
consultants. In Nepal the consultants are based in the Government, working directly with 
the Government on drafting the documentation. The Banks only come in at a later stage to 
ensure technical standards are there and that the proposals are realistic for implementation 
- as a review process, not as a drafting process - so the process is based on nationally 
identified priorities that we support. This is more time and resource challenging, but we feel 
is a more appropriate and country driven way of doing things.  
 
This represents a compromise by the MDBs towards greater government ownership of the process. 
However, the MOE suggested that greater government ownership would have included   more 
autonomy particularly over the PPCR funds; and suggested that the consultants were accountable to 
the MDBs and not to the Government.  Therefore in Nepal, the SPCR development process was 
certainly more government owned than it had been in some other PPCR countries, and certainly 
than it could have been. But, as pointed out by one donor, "it depends how you define government 
ownership".  
 
5.3 Transformational change 
 
The stated objective of the PPCR is,   
 
To provide incentives for scaled-up action and transformational change in integrating 
consideration of climate resilience in national development planning consistent with poverty 
reduction and sustainable development goals.79   
 
However, this "transformational change" remit has not been consistently defined by different 
stakeholders in the PPCR process in Nepal, and has been used to justify a number of different 
sometimes conflicting approaches. Box 2 describes three interpretations of "transformational 
change" from different stakeholder groups.  
 
From the perspective of the Government, transformational change means the capacity to adapt at 
all scales, from national and sectoral governance systems right down to the local level. The 
Government has put a great deal of emphasis on enabling adaptive capacity at the local level - 
exemplified by their focus on ensuring that 80% of funds for climate finance go on project 
implementation and not on higher level technical assistance (the Government has insisted that this 
is the case under the NAPA implementation; DfID/EU programme of work; and the PCPR). For the 
Government, transformational change is about seeing investments in climate change adaptation and 
resilience building realised on the ground through long term and sustainable mechanisms. They 
specifically argued that it is not all about building technical capacity at the national level, and that 
consulting services is not transformational. As noted by one MOE official,  
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Stop trying to build my capacity! We have done the NAPA, we have the capacity. Now we 
need to deliver to the ground.  We need to deliver resources to help vulnerable people 
adapt and cope.  When the vulnerable people can adapt, that is when transformation has 
happened.  
 
From the MDB perspective, 'transformational change' means providing access to knowledge and 
resources to be able to 'climate proof' development investments. Climate change is bringing about 
new risks, so 'business as usual' development planning is no longer enough and planning systems 
need to be 'transformed' in order to be able to take account of these risks. The Aide memoire from 
the second PPCR mission operationalises this perception in relation to SPCR planning in Nepal, as 
follows:  
 
 The traditional "business as usual" approach to development planning in Nepal is not 
designed to cope with current climate risks. National efforts to build climate resiliency 
suffers from a lack of high quality standardised data to inform early warning systems and 
insufficient technical capabilities to apply appropriate climate change risk management 
tools...In light of Nepal's resource (human, technical, financial) constraints, without SPCR 
intervention it is unlikely that the country could systematically undertake the 
transformational change required to build climate resiliency into development planning. 80 
 
Thus, transformational change from this perspective is dependent on data and technical capacity in 
Government planning systems.  
 
The donor perspective presented in box 2 represents DfID country office. DfID is one of the main 
donors to the PPCR in Nepal, and also to the two other major climate change investment 
programmes discussed here - the NAPA and the DfID/EU work programme. As such, DfID has a 
vested interest in seeing the PPCR well coordinated with the other climate change investment 
programmes; but this also perhaps encourages a 'bigger picture' perspective beyond the remit of the 
PPCR towards how to enable effective climate change resilience more generally, and creating an 
agenda behind which all investments can align, and a framework that would support all investments. 
A strong governance framework that enables access to finical, social, political and information 
resources that people need to adapt with, is an obvious fit.  
 
For the MDBs on the other hand, their primary remit is to demonstrate results and draw lessons 
against building climate resilience. As stated in the recent Aide memoire,  
 
"A key goal of Nepal's SPCR is to provide lessons through learning-by-doing over the next 
few years that demonstrate modalities for building climate resilience in water resource 
management and community development planning which can be replicated in other river 
systems and vulnerable communities.81 
 
Integrating climate change information into existing development strategies as a key aspect of 
transformational change is relatively straightforward approach that can be assessed and learned 
from.  Transforming what is meant by 'business as usual' in the first place, is much more 
problematic.   
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Generating “incentives for transformational change” therefore depends on how transformational 
change is understood. If “transformational change” is “climate-proofing” development, then the 
incentives are not to change existing approaches to development but to adapt them. The easiest 
way to demonstrate results is maintain existing donor-recipient relations – for donors to manage the 
process and not to take risks by transferring greater responsibility to governments, particularly as 
the adapted aspects of the development process are novel and require high technical and fiduciary 
standards. Indeed these incentives are embedded in the PPCR institutional framework because it sits 
outside the UNFCCC, underpinning the maintenance of existing donor-recipient relationships.  
 
On the other hand if transformational change means capacity building of the Government, the 
incentives are to give Government a greater degree of autonomy in managing the process, 
supported by capacity building but not driven by it. ‘Results’ from this perspective would reward 
increasing government ownership because this would be a key indicator of greater capacity, rather 
than the outputs of the strategy itself (although this too is of course important).    
Box 2: Interpretations of "Transformational change"  
 
Government: Transformational change means knowledge and capacity building - knowledge and skills and 
capacity to adapt that should be beyond consultants - capacity needs to be integrated  right down to the local 
level. Transformational change means people who need to adapt having the knowledge and skills to do it...and 
the support in place to let this happen and access to the resources and information they need, so they are not 
constrained by poverty, at all levels. 
 
MDBs: Transformational change means changing the way things are done so investments are not "business as 
usual"...this means new systems, processes and procedures in place for tackling climate change over and above 
development processes, for example early warning systems, integrated climate risks into systems of planning, 
the way choices about development investments are made, new approaches to engineering designs. With 
mitigation - this is easier - you can see how to transform the energy mix - but with adaptation we are learning - 
we need lessons about how to do things differently.   
 
Donors: Transformational change is about encouraging long term capacity to adapt, to build resilience. It is 
about the transformation of national systems for longer term "adaptive management" - we want Governance 
systems to be able to manage and respond to vulnerability, to be resilient enough to be able to manage the 
additional risks of climate change and to do this we need more effective systems of governance than we have 
now.  
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6. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This report has described the PPCR preparation in Nepal in detail from inception to date, before 
discussing some of the main points of negotiation, including the relationship between the NAPA and 
the PPCR; the institutional and financial governance of the PPCR for managing climate change; and 
the question of loan versus grant allocation.  It then went on to consider how these negotiations 
were influenced by different conceptualisations of some key themes that run through the PPCR 
preparation process, namely climate resilience (and the associated concepts of adaptation and 
adaptive capacity); national ownership and 'country drivenness'; and transformative change.   These 
different conceptualisations by different stakeholders are briefly summarised in table 1, below.  
Table 1: Summary of different conceptualisations by different stakeholder groups82 
 Climate resilience Adaptation National Ownership Transformational 
change 
Government  Synonymous 
with adaptation  
 Long term and 
strategic 
 Programmatic 
and integrated 
 Addresses 
underlying 
vulnerability to 
climate 
variability and 
climate change 
 Long term 
and strategic 
 Programmati
c and 
integrated 
 Addresses 
underlying 
vulnerability 
to climate 
variability 
and climate 
change  
 The NAPA 
presents 
Government 
climate change 
priorities 
 Government 
should be able to 
drive design 
process inc. fund 
allocation 
 Consultants 
should be 
accountable to 
Government 
 Beyond consultants 
and TA - full 
capacity within 
Government to 
manage CC 
 Adaptive capacity 
enhanced at the 
local level  
 Adaptive capacity 
no longer 
constrained by 
poverty  
MDB/Consult
ants 
 Long term and 
Strategic 
 Mainstreamed 
 "Climate 
proofing" 
 Climate risk 
management 
 Response to 
future climate 
change 
 An additional 
need in light of 
new climate risks 
 Urgent and 
immediate 
 Short term 
 Projectised 
 Response to 
current 
climatic 
variability  
 Does not 
adequately 
address 
longer term 
climate 
resilience  
 Consultants 
based inside 
Government and 
liaise frequently 
with 
Government 
 Government 
engaged with  
procurement 
 Consultants 
work with 
Government on 
drafting process 
 Moving beyond 
"business as usual"  
 Systems, processes 
and procedures are 
climate proofed 
 Over and above 
development - 
influence the way 
development 
decisions are made 
in light of climate 
change risks 
Donor   The same as 
adaptation, ie: 
 Long term and 
strategic 
 Programmatic 
 Long term 
and strategic 
 Programmati
c and 
integrated 
 The Government 
should be able to 
define climate 
change risks 
 NAPA represents 
 Transformation of 
national systems 
for longer term 
"adaptive 
management"  
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and integrated 
 Addresses 
underlying 
vulnerability to 
climate 
variability and 
climate change 
 Addresses 
underlying 
vulnerability 
to climate 
variability 
and climate 
change 
Government 
driven process 
so this should be 
built on 
 Recognises high 
fiduciary risks  
 Focus on 
governance  
 Moving away from 
a dependence on 
donor TA towards 
Governments being 
able to do this 
themselves 
 
One of the key findings to emerge from this exploration of the PPCR preparation process, is that 
these different conceptualisations are all related and mutually reinforcing, and they have had a 
significant impact on what issues were negotiated and how.  But these conceptualisations in turn are 
based on the 'bigger picture' remits and experiences of each stakeholder groups that create 
incentives for different approaches. For example, DfID as a donor not only to the PPCR but also to 
the DfID/EU programme of work and also to the NAPA, has a vested interest in seeing all 
investments as mutually reinforcing.   
For the Ministry of Environment, they have domestic accountability to both the Government and the 
people of Nepal (and frequently held to account by a vibrant civil society and media); and also to the 
international community under the UNFCCC, to which they have to demonstrate a good NAPA and 
to show that they have used the delay in NAPA preparation to their advantage. This makes sense in 
light of MOE's focus on using adaptation finance for delivery and not just TA (to generate visibility of 
climate change investments at the national and local scales); and also the strong requirements that 
the PPCR should build on NAPA.  
For the MDBs, the incentives are effectively to demonstrate results of the PPCR specifically - to 
"provide lessons through learning-by-doing over the next few years that demonstrate modalities for 
building climate resilience".83 The need to demonstrate results "in a few years" is at odds with an 
interpretation of "transformational change" that would see longer term support to stronger 
governance systems to support "adaptive management". The latter involves taking risks, handing 
over greater responsibility to national governments that may or may not have the capacity to take 
the agenda forward quickly and effectively. 
 
Thus, incentives are generated to 'climate proof' existing investments, rather than finding new ways 
to develop climate resilience. This is represented operationally by the fact the draft CIFs results 
framework actively rewards programmes that build on current MDB investments - a very different 
set of incentives to those required to achieve "transformational change" in the way that it is 
understood by the Government and donors.  
 
In practical terms, this study has highlighted the importance of understanding the underlying 
political economy behind certain conceptualisations that can drive negotiations around key issues. 
For example, the awareness of Nepal of the struggle many other LDCs faced in funding their NAPAs , 
in addition to pressure Nepal faced to demonstrate a successful NAPA given the additional effort and 
cofinancing that had gone into the process, may have been important factors in the Government's 
desire that PPCR could be used to fund NAPAs, and the resistance of the Government to the notion 
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that the PPCR had a different remit. Greater clarity should have been given at the outset of the PPCR 
process if this was never going to be the case; but if there was and continues to be a possibility that 
PPCR may fund NAPA activities, then this should be prioritised as an option given the importance of 
this to the Government.  
 
Recommendations 
 
In light of the above analysis this study makes the following recommendations for stakeholders 
engaged in the PPCR in Nepal as the process moves forward:  
 
i) Approaches to supporting national ownership  
 
 The “Mission-style” approach to PPCR planning was not conducive to fostering relationships 
between the different sets of stakeholders engaged in the PPCR or generating government 
ownership over the planning process. Once this was supported by the SPCR consulting team 
based in the Ministry, all stakeholders suggested that relations and understanding were 
improved and reinstating a similar mechanism for continuous working with MOE is 
recommended. 
 However, the reporting of this team primarily to the MDBs rather than to MOE, and the 
limited influence of MOE over the workings of the team limited government ownership and 
‘buy-in’ to the teams outputs. Further, once the team was disbanded the capacity built 
during their time there was also lost. It is recommended that a greater degree of control 
over any consulting team is given to MOE to ensure increased engagement and learning 
during the PPCR preparation process.  
 Short time-lines were given to MOE to comment on Mission outputs, however flexibility was 
given where deadlines could not be met. This flexibility should be maintained but working 
more closely with the government drafting and documentation perhaps through the 
mechanisms above should help all stakeholders to set and meet more realistic deadlines for 
feedback.  
 
ii) Wider incentives for transformational change 
 
Transformational change is interpreted as more than “climate proofing” development, but in 
building the capacity of the government of Nepal to achieve long term climate resilient 
development. In line with recommendation (i) this means moving away from a dependence on 
donor technical assistance towards Governments long term enhanced capacity.  
 
This requires mechanisms in place that reward greater government capacity and control, rather than 
those that reward fast and more tangible results. This may include:  
 Building in and emphasising government capacity indicators into monitoring and evaluation 
systems.  
 Reconsidering PPCR engagement in a multi-donor trust fund. This could increase the 
capacity and autonomy of the Government to manage adaptation investments, in line with  
“transformational change” objectives, in line with the PPCR mandate. This would increase 
national ownership and provide an opportunity for the Government of Nepal to 
demonstrate “absorptive capacity” for future large scale climate change finance.  
 PPCR implementing agencies need to be allocated time and resources to support the process 
of “transformational change.” With limited time and resources it is difficult to implementing 
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agencies to shift away from a ‘business as usual’ model, even if the ‘business’ is ‘climate 
proofed.’ 
 
Responsive approach 
 
There are currently no precedents for PPCR planning for achieving transformational change. This 
creates opportunities for donors and implementing agencies to be responsive to national demands. 
Examples from Nepal include:  
 Taking forward or incorporating some NAPA priorities. 
 Supporting government decisions over loan and grant components, acknowledging the 
pressure the government is under from civil society on this issue.   
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Annex 1: NAPA Priorities 
 
 
 
  
 
Priority Project Profile 
1 Promoting Community-based Adaptation through Integrated Management of 
Agriculture, Water, Forest and Biodiversity Sector 
2 Building and Enhancing Adaptive Capacity of Vulnerable Communities Through 
Improved System and Access to Service Related to Agricultural Development 
3 Community Based Disaster Management for Facilitating Climate Adaptation 
4 GLOF Monitoring and Disaster Risk Reduction 
5 Forest and Ecosystem Management for Supporting Climate Led Adaptation 
Innovations 
6 Adapting to Climate Challenges in Public Health 
7 Ecosystem Management for Climate Adaptation 
8 Empowering Vulnerable Communities through Sustainable Management of 
Water Resource and Clean Energy Supply 
9 Promoting Climate Smart Urban Settlement 
